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SPELLING GUILT OUT OF A RECORD?




[T]he question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but
whether guilt has been found by a jury according to the procedure and
standards appropriate for criminal trials .
INTRODUCTION
For nearly fifty years, Justice Frankfurter's precept has guided the
development of criminal harmless-error doctrine. The precept is a natu-
ral outgrowth of the Sixth Amendment,' which establishes the right to
trial by jury in serious criminal proceedings.3 As a result, courts properly
conducting harmless-error review in criminal cases have respected the
jury's constitutional role as factfinder, and have refrained from interpos-
ing themselves into the process as some sort of "super-jury."
All of this may be changing. In a series of recent cases, the Supreme
Court has sent conflicting signals regarding how reviewing courts should
analyze certain jury instruction errors-conclusive mandatory presump-
tions4 and elemental misdescriptions (or omissions)'-each of which tend
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Hugh H. Bownes, Senior Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. B.A. 1985, Dartmouth; J.D. 1988, Harvard. I
thank the Honorable Norman H. Stahl, Professor Larry Yackle, Ernest Young,
Jennifer Olsson, Jonathan Zasloff, and Jonathan Klavens for reading and commenting
upon earlier versions of this article. I also thank Janet Judge and Ken Lehman for
their willingness to discuss issues raised by the Article. Most importantly, I thank my
wife, Martha Madsen, and my son, Nathaniel, for their support and understanding
while I was writing.
1 United States v. Bollenbach, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.).
2 In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
3 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080 (1993) (recalling that the "right to
trial by jury in serious criminal cases [is] 'fundamental to the American scheme of
justice'" (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968))).
4 An instruction containing a conclusive mandatory presumption informs the jury
that once the prosecution has proved some predicate fact or facts, it must presume
that the prosecution has established an element of the crime. This, of course, removes
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to prevent the jury from fully considering and finding every element of
the offense charged. In one line of these cases, the Court seems to have
endorsed the harmless-error test that Justice Scalia proposed in his con-
currence in Carella v. California.' This "Carella test" assumes that the
presence of jury findings on each element of the offense charged is an
integral part of the criminal trial structure. In another line of precedent,
however, the Court has implied that reviewing courts may, after review-
ing the whole record, supply missing elemental determinations based
upon their view of what the jury would have done had the error not
occurred. Unfortunately, there has been a distinct trend among lower
courts, especially lower courts conducting collateral review, to disregard
Sixth Amendment concerns and follow the latter line of authority.7
This Article contends that courts should always apply the Carella test,
and not traditional whole-record review, when assessing the harmlessness
that element of the crime from the jury's consideration. See Francis v. Franklin, 471
U.S. 307, 314 n.2 (1985); see also infra part II.C.
5 An elemental misdescription is an instruction that incorrectly defines an element
of the offense charged. An elemental omission is an instruction that completely fails
to define an element. Like conclusive mandatory presumptions, misdescriptions and
omissions deprive the jury of its factfinding role by effectively removing an element of
the crime from the case. See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 270 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment); see also infra part II.D. For simplicity's sake, I will call both
types of error elemental misdescriptions.
6 Carella, 491 U.S. at 270-71 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (identifying the
"rare situations" in which conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental mis-
descriptions can be harmless error).
7 See, e.g., Green v. Peters, 36 F.3d 602, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the
whole record and finding that evidence of guilt rendered an instructional error harm-
less); Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1994) (similar), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 215 (1994); O'Neal v. Morris, 3 F.3d 143, 145-47 (6th Cir. 1993) (similar), cert.
granted on other grounds sub nom. O'Neal v. McAninch, 114 S. Ct. 1396 (1994); see
also United States v. Williams, 935 F.2d 1531, 1536-37 (8th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that
"overwhelming" record evidence of guilt renders an elemental misdescription harm-
less), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1189 (1992).
It is surprising how frequently courts must review the effects of instructional error
upon the jury's factfinding role. For example, the First Circuit addressed this concern,
either directly or in dictum, five times between March and November 1994. See
United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296 (1st Cir. 1994) (elemental misdescription), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 378 (1994), cert. denied, 1994 WL 571020 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1994) (No.
94-6372), cert. denied, 1994 WL 570803 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1994) (No. 94-6363), and cert.
denied, 1994 WL 570673 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-6331); Singleton v. United
States, 26 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 1994) (elemental misdescription), cert. denied, 1994 WL
418389 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-5551); Anderson v. Butler, 23 F.3d 593 (1st Cir.)
(elemental misdescription), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 331 (1994); Libby v. Duval, 19 F.3d
733 (1st Cir.) (conclusive mandatory presumption), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 314 (1994);
Ortiz v. DuBois, 19 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1994) (dictum regarding elemental misdescrip-
tions), petition for cert filed, (U.S. Aug. 9, 1994) (No. 94-5650).
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vel non of conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescrip-
tions. The problem with the whole-record approach is that it treats these
instructional errors as minor defects in the presentation of the case, and
loses sight of the constitutional rights they undermine. The resolution of
this issue is important; indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the
future of all harmless-error review depends upon it. After all, if record
evidence of guilt renders harmless those instructional errors that deprive
a defendant of the basic right to a jury trial, why should it not render
harmless all other constitutional errors?
I will offer three arguments in support of my thesis. First, harmless-
error analysis, while perhaps not itself of constitutional origins,' runs
afoul of the Constitution if it fails to take into account the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of a jury verdict on each element of the offense
charged. This is true for both direct and collateral review. Second, the
Sixth Amendment's jury-verdict guarantee confers upon a criminal
defendant a concomitant right to have the jury consider all evidence
admitted at trial that is relevant to each element of the crime charged
(hereinafter "admitted, elementally relevant evidence"). Third, tradi-
tional harmless-error review looks solely to whether the jury's findings
have been critically affected by an error, and therefore presupposes jury
findings. In other words, it cannot legitimately proceed in the absence of
jury findings.9 Thus, a different type of harmless-error test should be
employed when error has precluded the jury from making elemental
findings.
Part I of this Article summarizes the history of harmless-error review.
Part II explains more fully the constitutional infirmities generated by con-
clusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions, and
demonstrates that the unique nature of these infirmities complicates the
question of how courts should review them for harmlessness. It also
examines the Supreme Court's attempts to answer the questions of
whether, and how, conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental
misdescriptions should be reviewed for harmlessness. In so doing, it
focuses particularly on how these attempts have been undermined by the
Court's failure to take account of the structural rights undermined by
these errors. Finally, Part III argues that the Constitution, relevant
Supreme Court precedent, and policy considerations require application
of the Carella test when courts confront challenges to conclusive
8 In a recent article, Professor Daniel Meltzer acknowledged that the federal harm-
less-error rules cannot be traced to any particular constitutional provision, but argues
that they are rooted in constitutional common law. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless
Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 26-34 (1994).
9 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1993) (holding that
"[h]armless error review looks... to the basis on which 'the jury actually rested its
verdict' " (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991))).
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mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions. It also contends
that this test should apply on direct and collateral review.
I. HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW: THE ROAD TO BRECHT
In both England and the United States, the development of the crimi-
nal harmless-error doctrine has been a conservative's, or at least a
Burkean conservative's, nightmare.' ° Rather than cautiously evolving in
one general direction, prevailing conceptualizations of "harmlessness"
have, within relatively short periods of time, been entirely disregarded in
favor of nearly opposite approaches. The following is a brief overview of
the harmless-error doctrine's rather tumultuous history.
A. Early Approaches to Error
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the English common-law
approach to the problem of trial error swung like a pendulum between
two extremes. The eighteenth-century rule was that trial error required
the reversal of a conviction only when it appeared that the error resulted
in an incorrect verdict." In the early to mid-1800s, however, with the
passage of the Exchequer Rule, the English courts completely abandoned
this approach.' 2 Under the Exchequer Rule, a trial error as to the admis-
sion of evidence gave rise to a presumption of prejudice and almost auto-
matically required a new trial.' This presumption, designed to ensure
that appellate courts would not encroach upon the jury's factfinding
authority, "applied to even the most insignificant items of evidence.' 14 It
also arose when the trial judge erred in instructing the jury.15 As a result,
retrials became so routine that English cases " 'seemed to survive until
10 See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 654-56 (1994) (discussing Edmund
Burke's preference for slow and incremental reform so that each step in the process
can be tested for consistency with the accepted customs, traditions, and beliefs of the
government and society).
11 See 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 884-87 & nn.2-5 (Peter Tillers rev.
1983) (showing that regardless of prejudicial impact, a new trial occurred only when
the appellate court disagreed with the verdict); see also Craig Goldblatt, Comment,
Disentangling Webb: Governmental Intimidation of Defense Witnesses and Harmless
Error Analysis, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (1992) (same).
12 See, e.g., 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 26.6(a), at 257 (1984). While most commentators trace the Exchequer Rule to
Crease v. Barrett, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835), former California Supreme Court
Chief Justice Traynor argued that the Rule derived from subsequent cases that misap-
plied Crease. See ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 6-10 (1970).
13 See TRAYNOR, supra note 12, at 4-7.
14 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 257.
15 See id.
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the parties expired.' ,16
Parliament responded to this unacceptable situation with the Judica-
ture Act of 1873, which contained new harmless-error legislation. 7 This
Act rejected the approach of the Exchequer Rule, directing appellate
courts not to order a new trial on the basis of "the improper admission or
rejection of evidence" or a "misdirection" to the jury "unless ... some
substantial wrong or miscarriage has thereby been occasioned."' 18
American courts, which had adopted the Exchequer Rule as part of
their common-law inheritance from England, 9 were slow to follow suit.2°
Hence, American retrials were common, and American appellate courts
came under criticism for" 'tower[ing] above the trials of criminal cases as
impregnable citadels of technicality.' ,21 Indeed, as the Supreme Court
noted in Kotteakos v. United States, "So great was the threat of reversal
in many jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing
reversible error in the record, only to have repeated the same matching of
wits when a new trial had been thus obtained."2
By the early part of this century, the efforts of American reformers
seeking the adoption of a more permissive harmless-error doctrine began
to produce results,2" and in 1919, Congress established a federal harm-
less-error rule.24 Unlike England's Judicature Act of 1873, the American
harmless-error rule was not limited to specific types of errors; instead, it
only distinguished between errors that had engendered miscarriages of
justice and errors that had not infringed any party's substantial rights.25
In other words, the American rule was concerned "not merely with put-
ting technical error in its place, but also with precluding reversal when the
16 Id. (quoting Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1980)).
17 Id.
18 Id. (citing TRAYNOR, supra note 12, at 10-11).
19 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152, 156 (1991).
20 See 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 257 (reciting the history of the
Exchequer Rule).
21 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) (quoting Marcus A. Kava-
nagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial
Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)).
22 Id.
23 By 1926, 18 states had enacted harmless-error legislation, and 10 more had
established some sort of harmless-error doctrine through judicial fiat. 3 LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 258 n.5 (citing Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appel-
late Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 126, 147 (1926)). By 1967, all 50 states had harmless-error
statutes or rules. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
24 See Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (1988) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)).
25 See 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 258-59.
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denial or impairment of a substantial right had caused no injury."26
An elucidation of the vague directives of the federal harmless-error
statute occurred in Kotteakos v. United States.27 In Kotteakos, a jury had
convicted the defendants of a single general conspiracy to violate the
National Housing Act. The defendants challenged their convictions,
arguing that the trial evidence "proved not one conspiracy but some eight
or more different ones of the same sort."28 The issue presented was
whether the variance between the crime charged in the indictment and
the crime proved at trial had affected the substantial rights of the par-
ties.29 In holding that it had, the Court explained that the determination
hinged not upon whether the defendants were guilty or likely to be recon-
victed,3 ° but upon whether "the error had substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict."'" In an oft-quoted pas-
sage explaining this inquiry, Justice Rutledge stated:
[T]he question is, not were [the jurors] right in their judgment,
regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what
effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon
the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total
setting....
This must take account of what the error meant to them, not sin-
gled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.
And one must judge others' reactions not by his own, but with allow-
ance for how others might react and not be regarded generally as
acting without reason. This is the important difference, but one easy
to ignore when the sense of guilt comes strongly from the record.
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error
did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict
and the judgment should stand ......
Justice Rutledge concluded this passage with dictum indicating that harm-
less-error analysis "perhaps" would not apply "where the departure is
from a constitutional norm. 33
26 TRAYNOR, supra note 12, at 16.
27 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
28 Id. at 752.
29 See id. at 757-58.
30 Id. at 763-64.
31 Id. at 776.
32 Id. at 764 (citations omitted).
13 Id. at 764-65 (footnote omitted). This statement reflected the general practice
of the time-reversal of convictions obtained at trials in which constitutional error
had occurred. See 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 270. The lone possible
exception to this practice at the Supreme Court level was an ambiguous case decided
at the turn of the century. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (declining
to reverse the defendant's conviction despite the constitutionally erroneous admission
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B. Constitutional Error
For the next twenty years or so, the Supreme Court continued to
reverse convictions routinely upon finding constitutional error at trial. 4
During this same period, the Court, over vigorous internal dissent and
external criticism, significantly expanded procedural protections for crim-
inal defendants.3 5 As a result, on the eve of the 1967 decision in Chap-
man v. California,36 constitutional criminal procedure was ripe for some
sort of "taming" influence. 7 Chapman and its progeny provided this
influence in spades.
In Chapman, a prosecutor had violated the constitutional prohibition
against commenting upon the silence of an accused at trial .3  The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court applied that state's harmless-error rule3 9 and
affirmed the defendants' convictions for murder, kidnapping, and rob-
bery.4 ° The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Griffin error4' the
of evidence). The Motes decision may, however, be read as resting upon a waiver
theory. 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 270 n.80.
31 See Ogletree, supra note 19, at 157 & n.43 (collecting cases).
35 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (declaring that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires law-enforcement officials to
apprise those in custody of certain constitutional rights); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
414-17 (1963) (making habeas corpus relief available to criminal defendants whose
convictions were based upon coerced confessions), overruled by Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963)
(providing indigent criminal defendants with a fundamental right to the assistance of
counsel).
36 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
37 As then-Judge Cardozo noted, there is a
systematic process in the law, a process of taming. Great principles are
announced in a form that is both vague and potentially far-reaching. Pressure
then develops to tame them by reducing them to something that is both appar-
ently more clear and more objective, and apparently less threatening to estab-
lished institutions.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921); see also
Goldblatt, supra note 11, at 1243 n.25 (quoting Cardozo); Ogletree, supra note 19, at
158 (arguing that Chapman has allowed the Court to dilute the practical effect of
many of the important procedural protections recognized by the Warren Court).
38 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which
held that prosecutorial comment about a defendant's failure to testify unduly burdens
a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
39 CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. VI, § 41h (current version at CAL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 13).
40 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19-20. Justice Black, writing for the Court, first deter-
mined that the harmlessness vel non of a constitutional violation raised a federal, not
state-law, question because it implicated rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 21 (observing that the determination of "[w]hether a conviction
for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal constitutionally guar-
anteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal
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prosecutor committed was not harmless.42 In a significant shift from
prior practice, the Court stated that "there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may... be deemed harmless."4 At the same time,
the Court took pains to point out that "there are some constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error.",
44
Chapman has been read as establishing a two-pronged test applicable
to federal constitutional errors. The first prong, derived from the Court's
observation that there are some errors that can never be considered
harmless, asks if the error at issue is inherently amenable to harmless-
error review. 45 If it is, the second relevant question is whether "the bene-
ficiary of a constitutional error [proved] beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained., 41
The Chapman opinion provided little guidance as to specific methodol-
ogies appropriate for each prong of its test. In "explaining" which consti-
tutional guarantees are "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
never be considered harmless error," the Court merely noted three rights
in the "never harmless" category-the right to counsel, the right to an
impartial judge, and the right not to have a coerced confession introduced
into evidence 4 7-and indicated that this list was not exhaustive.48
Although it has since placed certain other guarantees into this same cate-
gory,4 a over time it has made clear that the "errors to which Chapman
constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they
have been denied").
41 See supra note 38.
42 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24-26.
43 Id. at 22. This conclusion followed a rather brief discussion:
All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States long
ago through its Congress established for its courts the rule that judgments shall
not be reversed for "errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties." None of these rules on its face distinguishes between federal consti-
tutional errors and errors of state law or federal statutes and rules. All of these
rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting
aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of
having changed the result of the trial.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 23.
45 Id. at 23-24.
46 Id. at 24. The Court, in constructing this prong of the test, looked to Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) (indicating that the relevant question must be
"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the [tainted] evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction").
47 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8 (citations omitted).
48 Id.
49 E.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2079 (1993) (constitutionally defi-
cient reasonable doubt instruction); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984)
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does not apply... are the exception and not the rule."5 Until just a few
years ago, however, the Court had provided no explicit framework to
determine whether particular errors could ever be harmless.
Arizona v. Fulminante5' filled this analytical vacuum in Chapman's
first prong. In Fulminante, a highly fractured Court52 upheld the Arizona
Supreme Court's determination that law-enforcement personnel had
coerced a confession from Oreste Fulminante,53 and ordered a new trial
with exclusion of the confession. 4 In so doing, however, a majority of
the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected previous decisions to the
contrary55 and held that the admission into evidence of a coerced confes-
sion can constitute harmless error.56
In reaching this conclusion, the Fulminante majority 57 set forth a
framework by which courts should determine whether challenged errors
are amenable to harmless-error review. It did so by dividing constitu-
tional errors into two types. First there are "trial errors," i.e., "error[s]
which occur[ ] during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
(abridgment of the right to self-representation at trial); see Young v. United States ex
rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809-14 (plurality opinion) (1987) (court
appointment of an interested party's attorney as prosecutor for contempt charges);
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (abridgment of the right to a public trial
is never harmless); see also Vazquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (opinion of
Marshall, J.) (mustering a plurality to declare never-harmless the unlawful exclusion
of members of a defendant's race from the grand jury).
50 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1986) (citation omitted); see also United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) ("[Ilt is the duty of a reviewing court ... to
ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations . . .
51 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
52 Fulminante contained three separate 5-4 majorities: one on an issue of substan-
tive law, another on the applicability of harmless-error analysis, and a third on the
correct outcome of harmless-error analysis. Five members of the Court held that the
confession at issue was coerced. Id. at 285-88 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Black-
mun, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ.). A different majority of five held that coerced confes-
sions could in some circumstances be harmless. Id. at 306-312 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Finally, because a majority of
the Court believed harmless error analysis appropriate, a third majority of five held
that, on the facts at hand, Arizona had not shown the error harmless. Id. at 295-302
(White, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.).
53 Id. at 285-88.
54 Id. at 302.
11 See id. at 288-90 (White, J., dissenting in part) (claiming that Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964), and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), dictated that admit-
ting a coerced confession into evidence can never be harmless).
56 Id. at 310.
57 Because this Article focuses on the amenability of particular errors to harmless-
error analysis, I shall use the term "Fulminante majority" to mean the majority that
found harmless-error analysis applicable to coerced confessions. See supra note 52.
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presented in order to determine whether [their] admission was harm-
less.""8 Second there are "structural errors," i.e., "defects in the constitu-
tion of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error'
standards." 59 In the three years since Fulminante, the Court has twice
reaffirmed that all "trial errors" are subject to harmless-error review.60
Chapman was equally vague as to how courts should apply its second
prong and determine whether the error "contribute[d] to the verdict
obtained., 6 1  Resolving this question of "harmlessness" obviously
requires an antecedent definition of the term "harm." To illustrate in
extreme terms, if one believes that a defendant has been "harmed" when-
ever a constitutional error had even the slightest impact upon the jury,
one will argue for reversal unless the government can show that the jury
was completely unaffected by the error. On the other hand, if one
believes that only an innocent defendant can be "harmed" by an error,
one will look solely to whether the untainted evidence establishes guilt.
The Supreme Court has endorsed neither of these divergent polar defi-
nitions of "harm." Instead, it has experimented with three more moder-
ate techniques for determining whether an error impermissibly
contributed to the verdict obtained.62 The first technique, suggested by
language in Chapman,63 looks solely at the incriminating nature of the
erroneously admitted material, and ignores the untainted evidence, to
make harmlessness assessments.6 ' The second instructs reviewing courts
to base their determinations on whether the error was "cumulative," that
is, duplicative of untainted evidence tending to establish the same fact or
facts as the erroneously admitted material.65 The third approach exam-
ines whether the jury likely gave the erroneously admitted material sig-
58 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
-9 Id. at 309. The Fulminante majority specifically noted the following as structural
errors: (1) total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial; (2) a biased judge; (3)
unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the grand jury; (4) depri-
vation of the right to self-representation; and (5) deprivation of the right to a public
trial. Id. at 309-10.
60 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082-83 (1993); Brecht v. Abraham-
son, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993).
61 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
62 See 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 279-81; Martha A. Field, Assessing
the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976).
63 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24 ("An error in admitting plainly relevant evi-
dence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot ... be con-
ceived of as harmless.").
64 See Field, supra note 62, at 26-27.
65 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969); see also Field, supra note 62,
at 37.
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nificant weight in light of the record as a whole.66
Although it has not been entirely clear on this point, the Court seems
to have settled upon the last of these three possible methodologies for
Chapman's second prong.67 Thus, it now appears that the Chapman test
involves a quantitative assessment of the erroneously admitted material
in the context of the other evidence, with a view towards whether the jury
likely gave the error significant weight.68
C. Harmless Error on Collateral Review
From 1967 through 1993, the Supreme Court applied the Chapman
harmless-error test on collateral review.69 In 1993, however, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 70
announced that courts should apply the ostensibly "less onerous" Kot-
teakos harmless-error standard when evaluating constitutional trial error
on collateral review.7' Thus, a habeas court assessing such a trial error
should ask only whether it had a "'substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict.' ,72
In Brecht, the prosecutor had impermissibly used the defendant's post-
Miranda silence for impeachment purposes at trial.73 The issue presented
was whether this use of the defendant's silence was harmless. The Court
66 See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1991); 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
12, at'281; Field, supra note 62, at 21-22.
67 See Yates, 500 U.S. at 403-04 (clarifying that Chapman requires reviewing courts
to weigh the probative force of the untainted evidence considered by the jury against
the probative force of the erroneously admitted material standing alone and to deter-
mine the significance of the error to reasonable jurors); see also 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 12, at 281.
The Court has, at times and in contexts other than those analyzed in this Article,
used language suggesting that the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt alone is
sufficient to render an error harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 510-11 (1983) ("The question a reviewing court must ask is this: absent [the con-
stitutional error], is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have
returned a verdict of guilty?"); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972)
(similar); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 (1972) (similar). Such formulations
ignore the clear rejection in Fahy and Chapman of a "correct result" test. See 3
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 279,281. They also are patently at odds with the
considered approach outlined in Yates and subsequently endorsed by a unanimous
Court in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1993).
68 See Yates, 500 U.S. at 403-04.
69 E.g., id. at 402; Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986); Milton, 407 U.S. at 372-
73 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 523-24 (1968) (per curiam).
70 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
71 Id. at 1722.
72 Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
71 This violates a criminal defendant's due process rights. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 618 (1976):
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began by observing that there exists a "spectrum" of constitutional
error.74 At one end of this spectrum are "trial errors," and at the other
end are "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism., 75
The Court concluded that the error before it "fit[ ] squarely into the cate-
gory of ... trial error. "76
After reaching this conclusion, the majority focused upon whether the
Chapman standard appropriately served certain interests implicated on
collateral review. Emphasizing (1) the state's interest in finality of con-
victions that have survived direct review; (2) comity; (3) federalism; and
(4) the interest in maintaining the prominence of the trial itself,77 the
Brecht majority determined that application of the Chapman standard on
habeas resulted in an "imbalance of ... costs and benefits., 78 As a result,
the majority embraced the Kotteakos standard, holding that it applies "in
determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of constitu-
tional error of the trial type.",79 The majority also emphasized that the
Kotteakos inquiry determines harmlessness "in light of the record as a
whole."80
II. THE PROBLEMS POSED BY CONCLUSIVE MANDATORY
PRESUMPTIONS AND ELEMENTAL MISDESCRIPTIONS
All of the cases discussed in the preceding section involved typical trial
error: the erroneous introduction of tainted information-e.g., unconsti-
tutionally obtained evidence or unconstitutional argument-at trial. For
typical trial errors, Chapman's second prong provides a relatively
straightforward method by which courts can conduct harmless-error
review.
Constitutionally defective jury instructions, however, often present
considerably more complicated questions. Instead of merely rendering
elemental findings suspect, as typical trial errors do, instructional error
can prevent the findings from taking place at all. This problem is most
severe with conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental
misdescriptions.
A. The Universe of Presumptions
In the criminal law, a jury instruction establishing a presumption tells
the jury that it can or must presume an element of the crime, e.g., intent,
once the prosecution has proved some basic, predicate fact or facts, e.g., a
74 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717 (1993).
71 Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1720.
78 Id. at 1721.
79 Id. at 1722.
80 Id.
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voluntary act. Before assessing the constitutionality of such a presump-
tion-creating instruction, a court must determine the nature of the pre-
sumption established, i.e., whether the presumption was "mandatory" or
"permissive. '"' A mandatory presumption is one that orders jurors to
presume the existence of any fact " 'necessary to constitute the crime...
charged.' "2 A permissive presumption gives the jury the freedom to
decide whether the predicate facts are sufficient to give rise to the conclu-
sion."3 If there is a "reasonable likelihood" 4 that the jurors interpreted
the instruction as "requir[ing]" them to apply the presumption, a review-
ing court must treat the presumption as mandatory.85
If the presumption is mandatory, the court then must determine
whether it is "conclusive" or "rebuttable."86 The Supreme Court has
characterized the difference between conclusive and rebuttable presump-
tions in the following way:
A conclusive presumption removes the presumed element from the
case once the State has proved the predicate facts giving rise to the
presumption. A rebuttable presumption does not remove the pre-
sumed element from the case but nevertheless requires the jury to
find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury
that such a finding is unwarranted.87
81 See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514-15 (1979).
82 Id. at 523.
83 See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985). A permissive presumption is
constitutional as long as the connection it allows the jury to make is a rational one.
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
84 In Sandstrom, the Court looked to whether "a reasonable juror could ... have
viewed [the] instruction as mandatory." Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515. More recently,
however, the Court has settled on a standard that asks whether there is a "reasonable
likelihood" that the jury misinterpreted the instruction. See Boyde v. California, 494
U.S. 370, 378-80 (1990) (tracing the evolution of the Sandstrom standard).
85 See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 519 ("[T]he fact that a reasonable juror could have
given the presumption conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect means that we cannot
discount the possibility that Sandstrom's jurors actually did proceed upon one or the
other of these ... interpretations."). This approach takes into account the "sound
presumption of appellate practice[ ] that jurors ... generally follow the instructions
they are given." Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991).
86 Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517-19.
87 Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2 (1985). Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989)
(per curiam), illustrates well the operation of a conclusive mandatory presumption.
The defendant in Carella had failed to return a rented car. Id. at 263. At his trial, the
court instructed the jury that it must presume embezzlement if it found that the
defendant had not returned the car within five days of the expiration of the lease
agreement. Id. at 264 n.2. Hence, once the state proved that the return of the car
was untimely, other elements of the crime of embezzlement, e.g., intent, were effec-
tively established and removed from the case.
If Carella had involved a rebuttable presumption, the elements would not have
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Once again, the relevant question for a court determining the nature of a
mandatory presumption is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury "would interpret the instruction as automatically directing a find-
ing of [the element to be presumed].""8
B. The Constitutionality of Presumptions
Historically, the common law did not regard as problematic jury
instructions that mandated the application of a presumption.89 In Sand-
strom v. Montana, however, the Court unanimously ruled that mandatory
presumptions violate the Constitution.9"
Petitioner David Sandstrom challenged his conviction for deliberate
homicide on the ground that a jury instruction given at his trial had
relieved the prosecution of proving that he had committed the homicide
intentionally.91 The instruction stated that "the law presumes that a per-
son intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."'92 In Sand-
strom's view, this instruction directed the jury to infer intent once the
state proved that death was an ordinary consequence of his voluntary
acts.93 He argued that this lowered the State's burden of proof, and
deprived him of a jury verdict on the intent element of the offense. 94
The Sandstrom Court initially determined that a reasonable juror could
have viewed the presumption as both mandatory and conclusive, and
then proceeded to analyze whether such a presumption could comport
with the Constitution." Noting that "'the Due Process Clause protects
been removed from the case. Rather, the burden of proof would have shifted and the
defense would have been required to demonstrate other facts indicating that the act
was not embezzlement.
88 Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515-16 (emphasis added); see also supra note 84.
89 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 304-05 (1850)
(endorsing presumption-creating instructions by holding that malice, which is an ele-
ment of the crime of murder, "is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against
another, however sudden," that "the implication of malice arises in every case of
intentional homicide," and that "[tihis rule is founded on the plain and obvious princi-
ple, that a person must be presumed to intend to do that which he voluntarily and
willfully does in fact .do, and that he must intend all the natural, probable, and usual
consequences of his own acts" (emphases added)).
90 Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520-24.
91 Id. at 512-13. The issue raised went to the heart of Sandstrom's defense, as
Sandstrom admitted that he had committed the homicide, but argued that he had not
done so "purposely or knowingly." Id. at 512. Under Montana law, purposeful or
knowing action constituted the intent element of the crime of deliberate homicide.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(a) (1978) (amended 1979 & 1987); see Sandstrom, 442
U.S. at 512-13.
92 Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 512.
93 Id.
94 Id.
9r Id. at 515-17.
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the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged,' "96 the Court found that a conclusive mandatory presumption
'would effectively eliminate [the element] as an ingredient of the
offense' " by " 'prejudg[ing] a conclusion which the jury should reach of
its own volition.' "I' This, in turn, "would 'conflict with the overriding
presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and
which extends to every element of the crime,' and would 'invade [the]
fact-finding function' which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the
jury."" s The Court also observed that a conclusive mandatory presump-
tion would deter the jury from looking at any evidence relevant to the
element other than that necessary to establish the predicate fact or
facts.99 Accordingly, the Court held that conclusive mandatory presump-
tions are unconstitutional.'00
Responding to Montana's alternative argument that even "if viewed as
a mandatory presumption ... the presumption did not conclusively estab-
lish intent but rather could be rebutted,"'' the Sandstrom Court also
analyzed whether a rebuttable mandatory presumption is constitutionally
permissible.0 2 After observing that such a presumption has the effect of
placing upon the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the
offense once the prosecution has established the predicate fact or facts,
the Court simply reaffirmed that the Due Process Clause requires the
government to " 'prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reason-
able doubt, and . . .not [to] shift the burden of proof to the defend-
ant.' "103 Thus the Court easily concluded that an instruction establishing
a rebuttable mandatory presumption on an element of the crime charged
is unconstitutional. 10 4 On several occasions subsequent to Sandstrom, the
Court has reiterated that an instruction setting up a mandatory presump-
tion on an element of the offense charged, be the presumption conclusive
or rebuttable, is unconstitutional. 0
96 Id. at 520 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
97 Id. at 522 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952)).
98 Id. at 523 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952), and
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978)).
99 See id. at 526 n.13; see also Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 406 n.10 ("[Tihe terms
of a conclusive presumption tend to deter a jury from considering any evidence for
the presumed fact beyond the predicate evidence; indeed, to do so would be a waste
of the jury's time and contrary to its instructions .. .
'oo Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523.
1O Id. at 515.
102 Id. at 524.
103 Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)); see also Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (preventing a state from burdening a murder
defendant with disproving malice to reduce murder to manslaughter).
104 Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524.
105 See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402 (1991) (rebuttable mandatory presump-
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C. The Differences Between Conclusive and Rebuttable Mandatory
Presumptions
Although conclusive and rebuttable mandatory presumptions are both
unconstitutional, they differ in two important respects. First, a conclusive
mandatory presumption altogether precludes the jury from making a
determination of the element upon which the presumption was
erected.10 6 On the other hand, a rebuttable mandatory presumption
instead merely directs the jury to presume the elemental fact (upon find-
ing the predicate fact or facts) unless and until the defendant has intro-
duced sufficient evidence to rebut the improper presumption. 10 7 Thus,
although it impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, a
rebuttable mandatory presumption requires the jury to go beyond the
presumption and make an independent finding of the element.108
Second, a conclusive mandatory presumption deters the jury from
looking at elementally relevant evidence. As Justice Scalia has pointed
out, the description of a presumption as rebuttable "conveys to the rea-
sonable jury that they not merely may but must determine whether [the
presumption] has been rebutted."'0 9 Accordingly, where there has been
a rebuttable mandatory presumption, a reviewing court may safely
assume that the jury considered all admitted evidence relevant to the ele-
ment on which the presumption was established.
D. Elemental Misdescriptions
A jury instruction that misdescribes, or entirely fails to describe, an
element of the offense charged works the same deprivation of a criminal
defendant's rights as does a conclusive mandatory presumption.1"' When
tion); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (per curiam) (conclusive
mandatory presumption); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576 n.5 (1986) (rebuttable
mandatory presumption); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317 (1985) (rebuttable
mandatory presumption); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 88 (1983) (plurality
opinion) (conclusive mandatory presumption).
106 Carella, 491 U.S. at 273 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
107 See Yates, 500 U.S. at 411-14 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); Carella, 491 U.S. at 272-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
1os See, e.g., Carella, 491 U.S. at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (A "jury,
instructed regarding a rebuttable presumption of malice could ... weigh the relevant
evidence and decide whether the presumption had been overcome."); Francis, 471
U.S. at 333 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe rebuttable presumption here indicates
that the particular element is still relevant, and may be shown not to exist.").
109 Yates, 500 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
11O Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), provides a good example of how an ele-
mental misdescription can operate. The defendants in Pope were convicted of selling
"obscene" magazines. Id. at 499. At their trial, the court had instructed the jury to
apply a "community standard" in making the elemental determination of whether the
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a trial judge has given a jury instruction that incorrectly describes an ele-
ment of the offense, the jury obviously will not have found that element
as it is properly defined. Necessarily, then, the jury will not have found
the element at all."' Thus, in addition to eliminating the prosecution's
burden of proving the element, such an instruction undermines the Con-
stitution's guarantee of a jury finding on that element."' So too does it
deter the jury from considering any evidence relevant to the element cor-
rectly described, but irrelevant to the element as misdescribed." 3
Accordingly, an instruction misdescribing an element of the offense is
unconstitutional. "14
III. HARMLESS-ERROR ANALYSIS OF CONCLUSIVE MANDATORY
PRESUMPTIONS AND ELEMENTAL MISDESCRIPTIONS
Having decided that jury instructions containing conclusive mandatory
presumptions, rebuttable mandatory presumptions, and elemental mis-
descriptions are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court next faced the ques-
tions of whether and how to review such errors for harmlessness. One
would have expected the Court to decide these issues in the order that
Chapman prescribes, first settling whether the constitutional rights
undermined by these errors are "so basic to a fair trial that their infrac-
tion can never be considered harmless," and if not, deciding upon an
appropriate methodology for determining whether the error was harm-
less." 5 The inquiry has not, however, proceeded neatly along these lines.
A. Amenable to Harmless-Error Review?
1. The Johnson and Rose Decisions
After concluding that mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional,
the Sandstrom Court specifically declined to address the argument that
"an unconstitutional jury instruction on an element of the crime can
magazines were "utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 499-500 & n.1. The
standard by which the jury should have made this determination, however, was
whether a reasonable person would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value in the material taken as a whole. Id. at 501. As a result, the jury never made
the social value determination under the correct legal standard. This, of course, effec-
tively removed the social value element from the case.
I" Id. at 508 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe juries that found petitioners guilty...
did not find one of the essential elements of [the] crime.").
112 Id.
113 For example, if some state defined a malicious act as an intentional and cruel
act committed in the absence of provocation, an instruction misdescribing a malicious
act as only an intentional and cruel act would deter the jury from looking at any
evidence relevant to whether the defendant was acting in response to provocation.
"I Pope, 481 U.S. at 501.
115 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Chapman
analysis).
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never constitute harmless error." 116  Four years later, in Connecticut v.
Johnson,"7 the Court confronted a subset of that question:" 8 whether a
conclusive mandatory presumption on the subject of intent was properly
subject to harmless-error analysis.
A jury convicted Lindsay Johnson of attempted murder, kidnapping,
robbery, and sexual assault." 9 The trial court's general instruction
regarding intent, however, contained a conclusive mandatory presump-
tion.120 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court's reversal of the convictions. 121
While allowing for the possibility of harmlessness, the plurality made
clear that an instruction establishing a conclusive mandatory presumption
almost always requires reversal. Specifically, the plurality stated that a
conclusive mandatory presumption can only be harmless in "rare situa-
tions" where "the reviewing court can be confident that [the] error did
not play any role in the jury's verdict.' ' 122 The Court identified two such
situations: (1) "if the erroneous instruction was given in connection with
an offense for which the defendant was acquitted and if the instruction
had no bearing on the offense for which he was convicted;" and (2) "if the
defendant conceded the issue [for which the presumption was
erected]."' 23
In conducting its analysis, the Johnson plurality did not emphasize the
effects of the presumption upon the prosecution's burden of proof, but
looked primarily to how the presumption invades the jury's factfinding
function. 124 After noting two cases in which the Court reversed convic-
tions on the basis of instructional error that had interfered with the jury's
116 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526-27 (1979). The Supreme Court of
Montana had not reached any facet of the harmlessness issue, having found the jury
instruction itself constitutional. State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (Mont. 1978),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). After the
United States Supreme Court's decision to remand, the Montana Supreme Court
evaluated the error under the Chapman standard, found the erroneous instruction
harmful, and ordered a new trial. State v. Sandstrom, 603 P.2d 244, 245 (Mont. 1979).
117 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
118 Id. at 74-75 (plurality opinion).
119 Id. at 75.
120 See id. at 78. The instruction stated: "[A] person's intention may be inferred
from his conduct and every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and
necessary consequences of his act." Id.
121 Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the four-Justice plurality. Justice Ste-
vens concurred only in judgment, arguing that the appeal did not present a federal
question because the Connecticut Supreme Court had merely (and permissibly)
elected not to apply harmless-error analysis to the challenged error. Id. at 88-90.
122 Id. at 87 (plurality opinion).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 82-84.
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ability to make elemental determinations,' the plurality analogized con-
clusive mandatory presumptions to directed verdicts in favor of the pros-
ecution.12 6 In fact, the opinion went so far as to state that "a conclusive
presumption on [an elemental issue] is the functional equivalent of a
directed verdict on that issue.'
127
Importantly, the plurality never explicitly stated that the invasion of the
jury's factfinding function occasioned by the conclusive mandatory pre-
sumption deprived Johnson of a constitutional right "so basic to a fair
trial" that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error. It did,
however, emphasize that a conclusive mandatory presumption deters the
jury from considering any evidence relevant to the issue on which the
presumption is erected, but not relevant to the predicate factual findings
that serve to trigger the presumption. 28 In fact, the plurality concluded
that the right to have the jury consider all admitted, elementally relevant
evidence is a "basic" right, the abridgment of which can never constitute
harmless error.
129
Because Johnson was a plurality opinion and involved only a conclu-
sive mandatory presumption, it is not surprising that the Court revisited
the questions of whether and how harmless-error analysis should apply to
mandatory presumptions in general.13 0  Three years after Johnson, in
Rose v. Clark,'3' the Court returned to these issues in a case involving a
rebuttable mandatory presumption. s2
125 Id. at 82-83 (citing both Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 613-15
(1946) (improper presumption on element of offense), and United Bhd. of Carpenters
& Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408-09 (1947) (elemental misdescription)).
126 Id. at 84. Of course, a trial court may not direct a verdict for the government in
a criminal case. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73
(1977); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408
(1947); Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895).
127 Johnson, 460 U.S. at 84. In so stating, the plurality did not directly respond to
Justice Powell's compelling argument that the directed-verdict analogy is imperfect
because a jury instructed to apply a conclusive mandatory presumption upon making
certain predicate findings still must find the predicate fact or facts before applying the
presumption. Id. at 96-97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 84-88 (plurality opinion).
129 Id. at 88.
130 Indeed, Chief Justice Burger wrote separately in Johnson "to emphasize that
the Court today does not adopt a rule of automatic reversal for Sandstrom error." Id.
at 90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices felt that conclusive and rebut-
table presumptions were amenable to harmless-error review, and that the proper
inquiry was "whether the evidence was so dispositive of intent that a reviewing court
can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to
rely on the presumption." Id. at 97 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
13 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
132 In the interim between the Johnson and Rose decisions, the Court did have
occasion to review instructions containing a rebuttable mandatory presumption. See
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A Tennessee jury had convicted Stanley Clark of first- and second-
degree murder for two intentional homicides. 133 An instruction given at
his trial had established a rebuttable mandatory presumption on the issue
of malice, an element of murder under Tennessee law.' The Court, by a
6-3 majority, held that this type of error could be harmless.' 35 Surpris-
ingly, however, given that it was reviewing only a rebuttable mandatory
presumption, the Rose majority indicated that it was rejecting the plural-
ity opinion in Johnson,136 and implied that its holding would govern all
"Sandstrom error."' 3
7
In formulating its holding, the Rose majority did not state that the gen-
eral rights undermined by the two types of mandatory presumptions were
not "basic to a fair trial." In fact, despite its facial applicability to all
mandatory presumptions, the majority opinion made no mention at all of
the fact that conclusive mandatory presumptions tend to undermine (1)
the right to have the jury make all elemental determinations; and (2) the
right to have the jury consider all admitted, elementally relevant evi-
dence. 138 Instead, it merely recited several errors that the Court had con-
sidered to fall within the "never harmless" category, 39 observed that
these errors "either aborted the basic trial process,... or denied it alto-
gether," 140 and concluded from this that "[h]armless-error analysis . . .
presupposes [only] a trial, at which the defendant, represented by coun-
sel, may present evidence and argument before an impartial judge and
jury. '14 ' Because a rebuttable mandatory presumption "does not com-
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). In Francis, however, the majority declined to
resolve the question of whether this type of error is properly subject to harmless-error
review because the error committed at defendant's trial could not be considered
harmless "even under the harmless-error standard proposed by the dissenting Justices
in [Johnson]." Id. at 325-26.
133 Rose, 478 U.S. at 574.
134 Id. at 572. The instruction stated:
All homicides are presumed to be malicious in the absence of evidence which
would rebut the implied presumption. Thus, if the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that a killing has occurred, then it is presumed that the killing
was done maliciously. But this presumption may be rebutted by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, or by both, regardless of whether the same be offered by
the Defendant, or exists in the evidence of the State.
Id. at 574 (ellipses omitted).
135 Id. at 579-80.
136 See id. at 580-82 (citing with approval the arguments of the Johnson dissent).
137 Id. at 580-81.
138 The majority did confirm, however, that a complete denial of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to have a jury determine guilt can never be harmless error. Id. at 578.
139 See id. at 577-78 (listing the introduction of a coerced confession, complete
denial of the right to counsel, and adjudication by a biased judge).
140 Id. at 578 n.6 (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 578.
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pare" with these types of errors,"" the majority held "that the error at
issue here-an instruction that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
on malice-is not 'so basic to a fair trial"43 that it can never be
harmless."' 44
With regard to the inquiry into whether mandatory presumptions com-
promise "basic" rights, then, Rose contained two significant flaws. First,
in deciding that the error before it did not undermine basic rights, the
opinion focused on the nature of the error, finding it qualitatively differ-
ent from other errors that the Court had decided are never harmless.
Obviously, however, it is not the qualitative nature of the error that
should determine suitability for harmless-error review; it is the qualitative
nature of the constitutional rights undermined by the error.
Second, by carelessly describing the rebuttable mandatory presumption
before it as "Sandstrom error" and indicating that its holding should gov-
ern all Sandstrom error, Rose improperly ignored important differences
between conclusive mandatory presumptions and rebuttable mandatory
presumptions. As I have explained, conclusive mandatory presumptions
undermine two constitutional rights not infringed by rebuttable
mandatory presumptions. 145 As a result, in the wake of Rose, the Court
has assumed, without ever having explicitly reached this conclusion, that
the rights to have the jury make all elemental determinations and to con-
sider all elementally relevant evidence are not "basic rights."
2. Subsequent Case Law
In 1989 the Supreme Court expressly confirmed that the Rose holding
does govern conclusive mandatory presumptions. Moreover, despite the
differences between rebuttable mandatory presumptions and elemental
misdescriptions, the Court also has deemed the Rose holding applicable
in cases involving elemental misdescriptions.
Carella v. California,'14 a per curiam opinion, extended Rose to conclu-
sive mandatory presumptions with no analysis of how such presumptions
differ from rebuttable mandatory presumptions. 47 This occurred despite
Justice Scalia's compelling concurrence, which emphatically explained
142 It does not, after all, prevent a defendant from introducing evidence and mak-
ing arguments to support a claim of innocence to a "fairly selected, impartial jury,
supervised by an impartial judge." See id. at 579.
143 It is, of course, not the error that is basic to a fair trial; it is the right that the
error tends to undermine.
144 Rose, 478 U.S. at 580 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967))
(footnote omitted).
"I See supra part II.C (noting that, unlike conclusive presumptions, rebuttable
presumptions neither completely preclude the jury from making an elemental finding
nor deter it from considering elementally relevant evidence).
146 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam).
14 See id. at 263-67.
1994]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:819
that (1) a rebuttable mandatory presumption merely effectuates an erro-
neous shift in the burden of proof, whereas a conclusive presumption pre-
cludes the jury from "mak[ing] any factual determination of the
elemental fact"; and (2) a rebuttable mandatory presumption does not
preclude the jury from weighing the relevant evidence. 4 '
Similarly, Pope v. Illinois'49 applied Rose to elemental misdescrip-
tions 150 without taking note of the differences between elemental mis-
descriptions and rebuttable mandatory presumptions. The Pope majority
relied heavily on the fact that the jury had at least made a finding (albeit
a tainted one) on the misdescribed element. 15 ' Because it believed that
this tainted finding might in some cases conclusively establish the missing
element, 152 the Pope majority concluded that harmless-error analysis is
appropriate in the case of an elemental misdescription."5 I In a footnote it
added: "To the extent that cases prior to Rose may indicate that a convic-
tion can never stand if the instructions provided the jury do not require it
to find each element of the crime under the proper standard of proof,
after Rose ... they are no longer good authority."' 54
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun, forcefully made the point that an elemental misdescription,
unlike the rebuttable mandatory presumption at issue in Rose, completely
precludes the jury from making a finding on one of the elements of the
crime charged. 15  Thus, Justice Stevens argued:
[A]pplication of the harmless-error doctrine under these circum-
stances would not only violate petitioners' constitutional right to trial
by jury, but would also pervert the notion of harmless error. When a
court is asked to hold that an error that occurred did not interfere
with the jury's ability to legitimately reach the verdict that it reached,
harmless-error analysis may often be appropriate. But this principle
cannot apply unless the jury found all of the elements required to
support a conviction. The harmless-error doctrine may enable a
court to remove a taint from proceedings in order to preserve a
jury's findings, but it cannot constitutionally supplement those find-
148 Id. at 273 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Rose jury ... was com-
pelled to [ ] weigh the relevant evidence and decide whether the presumption had
been overcome.").
149 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
150 See id. at 497-504.
1'1 See id. at 502-03.
152 Id. at 503 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1986)).
153 Id. at 503-04.
154 Id. at 503 n.7 (citing Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384 (1986), as a case
superseded by Rose).
155 Id. at 507-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the trial court in Rose had
not removed the issue of intent from the jury's consideration, but instead had shifted
the burden of disproving intent to the defendant).
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ings. It is fundamental that an appellate court (and for that matter, a
trial court) is not free to decide in a criminal case that, if asked, a
jury would have found something that it did not find. 6'
B. How to Review for Harmlessness
The failures to take note of the rights undermined by mandatory pre-
sumptions, to explain why these are not basic rights, and to distinguish
between conclusive and rebuttable mandatory presumptions were not the
only significant defects in Rose. Unfortunately, that case also sent out
conflicting signals as to how courts should determine whether mandatory
presumptions are harmless.
On the one hand, the Rose majority seemed to suggest the use of some
form of traditional whole-record harmless-error analysis. Justice Powell
stated that "[w]here a reviewing court can find that the record developed
at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fair-
ness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed."' 57 On the
other hand, the majority also offered a narrower test:
When a jury is instructed to presume [an element of the crime
charged] from predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those
predicate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. In many cases, the predi-
cate facts conclusively establish [the presumed element] so that no
rational jury could find [the predicate facts and not also find the ele-
ment on which the presumption was constructed]. In that event...
the jury has found ... every fact necessary to establish [the] element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'58
This ambiguity provided the impetus for Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Carella v. California.'59
Justice Scalia stated his premise and purpose at the outset of his
opinion:
[T]he harmless-error analysis applicable in assessing a mandatory
conclusive presumption is wholly unlike the typical form of such
analysis. In the usual case the harmlessness determination requires
consideration of the trial record as a whole in order to decide
whether the fact supported by improperly admitted evidence was in
any event overwhelmingly established by other evidence. Such an
expansive inquiry would be error here, and I think it important both
to explain why and to describe the mode of analysis that is appropri-
156 Id. at 509-10 (footnote omitted).
157 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
158 Id. at 580-81 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This mode of
analysis was first suggested in Justice Powell's dissent in Johnson, see Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 96-97 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting), and was subsequently
employed by the Pope majority, see 481 U.S. at 503-04.
159 491 U.S. 263, 267-73 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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ate. The Court's mere citation of Rose is inadequate to those ends,
since, for reasons I shall describe.... that case itself is ambiguous. 6 '
Deemphasizing the presumption's effect on the prosecutor's burden of
proof, Justice Scalia hinged his argument on the fact that a conclusive
mandatory presumption invades the jury's factfinding function. Noting
that the Sixth Amendment "right to a jury trial embodies 'a profound
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered,' "161 he argued that the right to have the jury find the facts
at a criminal trial "is a structural guarantee that 'reflects a fundamental
decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust ple-
nary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a
group of judges.' ,162 This mistrust of judicial discretion, he pointed out,
underlies the constitutional prohibition against allowing judges to direct
verdicts for the prosecution in criminal cases.' 63
Justice Scalia asserted that the availability of harmless-error review
should therefore be circumscribed in cases of conclusive mandatory pre-
sumptions and their analytical analogues, elemental misdescriptions.' 64
This view derived from the principle that " 'the [harmless-error] question
is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has
been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards appropri-
ate for criminal trials.' ,165 Where there have been no elemental findings
by a jury, subsequent " 'findings made by a judge cannot cure deficiencies
in the jury's findings as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant ... ."166
No matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt in the record, " 'the
error ... is that the wrong entity judged the defendant guilty.' ,167
Having articulated the unique Sixth Amendment problems caused by
instructional errors that tend to interfere directly with the jury's factfind-
ing role, Justice Scalia nonetheless recognized that such errors can be
harmless in a narrow set of circumstances where a " 'reviewing court can
be confident that [they] did not play any role in the jury's verdict.' ,168
Building from the Johnson plurality 16 and the Pope majority, 7 ° he then
proposed a three-part test for determining whether instructions contain-
160 Id. at 267 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
161 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
162 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
163 Id.
164 See id. at 269-71.
165 Id. at 269 (quoting United States v. Bollenbach, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946)).
166 Id. (quoting Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1986)).
167 Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986)).
168 Id. at 270 (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87 (1983)).
169 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson's reference
to the two " 'rare situations' " in which a conclusive mandatory presumption could
not have affected the jury's verdict).
170 See supra note 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Pope majority's
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ing conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions
are harmless. First, did the presumption or misdescription pertain only to
an element of a crime of which the defendant was acquitted? Second, did
the presumption or misdescription pertain only to an element to which
the defendant admitted? Third, could no rational jury have made the
findings that it did without also finding the presumed or misdescribed
element?' 7 ' Unless the answer to one of these questions is yes, the error
is not harmless because it is not " 'beyond a reasonable doubt' " that the
jury found the facts necessary to support the conviction."' 72
Justice Scalia ended his concurrence by arguing that Rose should not
be read as endorsing typical whole-record harmless-error review of con-
clusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions. 173 He
contended that even if whole-record review were somehow appropriate
when the error at issue is a rebuttable mandatory presumption, 174 courts
should not apply the whole-record approach when the error completely
deprives the jury of its factfinding role. 175
Since Carella, the Court has failed to clarify whether courts should
review conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescrip-
tions under the typical, whole-record harmless-error standard, or under
the narrower Carella test. On one hand, dicta in Yates v. Evatt'76 and
indication that, in some cases, the facts found conclusively establish a misdescribed
element).
171 See Carella, 491 U.S. at 270-71 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). If
the answer to this third question is "yes," the jury's actual findings are "functionally
equivalent" to the missing findings. Id.
172 Id. (quoting and applying the Chapman harmless-error standard).
173 Id. at 271-72.
174 In fact, subsequent to both Rose and Carella, the Court articulated a harmless-
error methodology for reviewing rebuttable mandatory presumptions that, despite
being "whole-record," is "more restrictive" than the "whole-record" harmlessness
inquiry suggested by Rose. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402-03 n.8 (1991). Under
Yates, courts reviewing for harmlessness the effects of rebuttable mandatory presump-
tions must (1) ask what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict;
and (2) weigh the probative force of that evidence against the probative force of the
presumption standing alone. Id. at 404. Of course, because conclusive mandatory
presumptions and elemental misdescriptions preclude the jury from considering evi-
dence other than that relating to the predicate facts and misdescribed elements, a
whole-record test would not be appropriate for courts reviewing the effects of these
errors. See id. at 405-06 & n.10 (noting the narrowing effect of a conclusive
mandatory presumption and citing, seemingly approvingly, the Carella test as the
appropriate standard for reviewing the effects of such a presumption).
175 See supra parts II.C-D (discussing the different effects of conclusive mandatory
presumptions, rebuttable mandatory presumptions, and elemental misdescriptions).
176 500 U.S. at 406 n.10 ("For reviewing the effects of a conclusive presumption, a
restrictive analysis has been proposed .. . ." (citing Carella, 491 U.S. at 271 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment))).
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Sullivan v. Louisiana177 seem to support Justice Scalia's Carella
approach. Moreover, the Yates Court all but repudiated the suggestion in
Rose that evidence of guilt in the record as a whole is sufficient to render
a mandatory presumption harmless. 178 On the other hand, the Fulmi-
nante majority, in a lengthy string citation, listed conclusive mandatory
presumptions and elemental misdescriptions as examples of trial
errors, 179 and then stated that trial errors are subject to a quantitative
assessment in light of the whole record.'8 0 Over the past few years, this
ambiguity has fostered predictable confusion in the lower courts.' 8 1
C. The Habeas Wild Card
Although the ambiguity discussed in the preceding subsection has
proven problematic for reviewing courts, prior to Brecht v. Abraham-
son'8 2 these problems arose only in the context of Chapman's "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. In Brecht, however, the Court
rejected the Chapman standard on collateral review. 183 As a result,
habeas courts inclined to apply the Carella test to conclusive mandatory
presumptions and elemental misdescriptions confront an additional diffi-
culty. Is Carella solely descendant from Chapman, and must it therefore
give way on habeas to whole-record review? Or are the factors that drive
the Carella test of sufficient gravity to mandate application of the Carella
test on collateral review, even in the Brecht/Kotteakos regime?
Although several federal circuit courts have encountered collateral
challenges to mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions
since Brecht, the First Circuit has grappled with the issues raised by such
challenges most directly and extensively. 84  In Libby v. Duval,i8 5 the
First Circuit, which previously had employed a form of the Carella test on
177 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993) (reciting what is, in essence, the Carella test).
178 Yates, 500 U.S. at 406-07 & n.11.
179 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1991).
180 Id. at 307-08, 310.
181 Compare United States v. Williams, 935 F.2d 1531, 1536-37 (8th Cir. 1991) (sug-
gesting that "overwhelming" record evidence of guilt renders an elemental misde-
scription harmless), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1189 (1992) with United States v.
Mendoza, 11 F.3d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing elemental misdescription under
Carella's "functionally equivalent" test) and United States v. MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 55 n.20 (1st Cir. 1.991) (similar).
182 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
183 As I have explained, habeas courts assessing the harmlessness vel non of a con-
stitutional trial error should ask whether the error had "a substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kot-
teakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). This standard is ostensibly "less
onerous" than the Chapman requirement that the error be harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. See generally supra part I.C.
184 See supra note 7 (collecting cases).
185 19 F.3d 733 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 314 (1994).
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direct review, 86 refused to apply it on collateral review." 7
A Massachusetts jury convicted Clayton Libby of first-degree murder
for a stabbing that took place in the course of a drunken brawl.18 8 At his
trial, the judge instructed that malice, an element of the crime of first-
degree murder, "is implied in every deliberate cruel act by one against
another.' 1 9 The federal district court with which Libby filed his request
for habeas relief ruled that the instruction unconstitutionally directed the
jury to find malice upon finding a deliberate cruel act.190 That court fur-
ther found, however, that the instruction was "harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt."' 9 '
On appeal from denial of the petition, the First Circuit agreed that the
instruction constituted Sandstrom error, adding that it should be
regarded as a conclusive mandatory presumption "because it was framed
in irrefutable and unvarying terms" and was "at least reasonably likely [to
have] completely removed the element of malice from the case once the
Commonwealth established that petitioner had acted deliberately and
cruelly."' 92 Thus, the court faced the question of whether the error was
harmless. Because the Supreme Court had decided Brecht in the period
of time between the district court's decision and the First Circuit's consid-
eration of Libby's petition, the appellate panel relied upon it in deciding
whether to conduct a whole-record review or to employ the narrower
Carella test. 193
The majority acknowledged that whole-record review would require
the court to supply the missing malice finding, and would entail analysis
of malice-related evidence that the jury had not considered.'94 Nonethe-
less, it believed itself "constrained" by both Fulminante's indication that a
conclusive mandatory presumption is a trial error and Brecht's admoni-
tion that trial errors are subject to whole-record review under the "sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence" standard. 195 Thus, the majority
186 See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 55 n.20
(1st Cir. 1991).
187 Libby, 19 F.3d at 740.
188 Id. at 734.
189 Id. at 735.
190 Id. at 736. There was evidence in the record that Libby was embroiled in "sud-
den combat." Under Massachusetts law, sudden combat is a mitigating circumstance
sufficient to negate malice and to reduce a verdict of murder to manslaughter. See
Commonwealth v. Richard, 384 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Mass. 1979). The instruction that
Libby challenged, however, precluded the jury from considering this sudden combat
evidence because it directed the jury to infer malice once it found that Libby had
acted deliberately and cruelly.
191 Libby, 19 F.3d at 736.
192 Id. at 738.
193 Id. at 738-39.
194 Id. at 740.
195 Id. at 739.
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examined the entire trial record and concluded that, even with correct
instructions, it was "unlikely" that the jury would have reached a differ-
ent verdict. 196 Accordingly, the court regarded the conclusive mandatory
presumption as harmless under Brecht.197
In dissent, Judge Stahl argued that habeas courts should utilize the
Carella test when evaluating the harmlessness of conclusive mandatory
presumptions. 198 He cited the need to preserve criminal defendants' con-
stitutional rights (1) to have the prosecution prove all elements of the
offense charged; (2) to have the jury make all elemental determinations;
and (3) to have the jury consider all elementally relevant evidence.' 99 He
also argued that Brecht should not be read as foreclosing application of
the Carella test on collateral review.2 °
°
Applying the Carella test, Judge Stahl argued that a rational jury could
have found that Libby acted deliberately and cruelly, but also found that
he was acting without malice in the course of sudden combat.2°' In other
words, the jury's finding of a deliberate and cruel act was not the func-
tional equivalent of a finding of malice, and did not satisfy the third (and
only applicable) prong of the Carella test. Thus, Judge Stahl deemed the
error harmful.202
IV. HONORING THE MANDATES OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT:
THE CARELLA TEST SHOULD APPLY ON BOTH DIRECT AND
COLLATERAL REVIEW
How, then, should the concept of harmless error work in the context of
conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions? And
should it work differently on collateral review than it does on direct
review? The key to answering these questions lies in doing what Rose
and its progeny failed to do: identifying the nature of the constitutional
rights usually undermined by these two errors, particularly the rights to
196 Id. at 740.
197 Id. A brief concurrence by Judge Cyr, the second member of the Libby major-
ity, acknowledged the difficulty of the question:
Although I share my dissenting brother's belief that the Carella concurrence
articulates compelling grounds for more narrowly confining "harmless error"
review of a jury instruction mandating a conclusive presumption, I join the
majority opinion because I am satisfied that the review required by the Court in
Brecht encompasses the entire record.
Id. (concurring opinion).
198 Id. at 742 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 741.
200 Id. at 743 (arguing that although Chapman "contemplates a whole-record
review every bit as much as Brecht does .... the Court has made clear in the Chap-
man context that, when confronted with presumption error, the typical form of whole-
record analysis does not apply").
201 Id. at 744-45.
202 Id.
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have the jury make all elemental determinations and consider all admit-
ted, elementally relevant evidence. Once these rights are understood as
structural, it becomes clear that courts reviewing conclusive mandatory
presumptions and elemental misdescriptions for harmlessness-unlike
other structural errors, conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemen-
tal misdescriptions can be harmless in a few instances-should utilize the
contextually sensitive Carella test.
A. Getting Back to Basics: The Nature of the Rights Undermined by
Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions
As I have explained, the majority opinions in Rose, Carella, and Pope
did not analyze the constitutional rights undermined by conclusive
mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions. °3 It is there-
fore not surprising that the Court has not yet discussed how these rights
fit into Fulminante's framework for distinguishing between errors suita-
ble for harmless-error review and errors denying rights so basic to a fair
trial that their commission can never be considered harmless-the trial-
error/structural-error dichotomy.20 4 Fortunately, however, there are
other guideposts available. The Court's very definition of the term
"structural error," and its analysis of deficient reasonable-doubt instruc-
tions in Sullivan v. Louisiana,205 suggest that interference with the rights
to have the jury make all elemental determinations and consider all
admitted, elementally relevant evidence constitutes structural error.
As an initial matter, it is important to note the common constitutional
origins of these two rights. The right to have the jury make all elemental
determinations in a serious criminal case derives, of course, from the
Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. In Sullivan, the Court described
as "self-evident" the fact that (1) the Due Process Clause's guarantee that
the prosecution persuade the factfinder "beyond a reasonable doubt" of
the facts necessary to establish each element of the offense charged; and
(2) the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury verdict, combine to cre-
ate a Sixth Amendment right to a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt.206 Similarly, the due process guarantee that the prosecution
bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged2 07 and the
Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury verdict must be read together
as creating within the jury-trial guarantee a right to a jury verdict on all
elements of the offense charged.208
203 See supra notes 136-56 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
205 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
206 Id. at 2080-81.
207 Id. at 2080 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)).
208 Cf. id. at 2080-81 (stating that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury, rather
than the judge, to reach the requisite finding of guilt, no matter how overwhelming
the evidence of guilt may be).
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Although it is less immediately apparent, the Sixth Amendment jury-
trial right also encompasses the right to have the jury consider all admit-
ted, elementally relevant evidence. If a guilty verdict premised upon a
lesser quantum of proof than is constitutionally mandated denies the
jury-trial right,209 so too must a guilty verdict arrived at by a jury pre-
cluded from considering admitted evidence certain to have affected the
quantum of proof. Put another way, the verdict is no more valid when
the jury finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without considering admit-
ted evidence likely to have affected its level of doubt, than when the jury
finds guilt despite possibly having had reasonable doubts. Therefore, the
right to have the jury consider all elementally relevant evidence must be
considered part of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee.210
This leads to the main point. In Fulminante, the Court described as
never-harmless those errors that engender "structural defects in the trial
mechanism.",211 Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished these errors from
simple errors in the trial process, defining the former as breakdowns that
affect "[tihe entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end" and "the
framework within which the trial proceeds., 212 As the Court noted, such
errors deprive criminal defendants of basic protections, without which
" 'a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for deter-
mination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be
regarded as fundamentally fair.' ,213
209 See id. at 2081 (observing that the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial right is not
satisfied by a jury verdict finding that the defendant is "probably guilty," while leav-
ing it up to the judge to decide whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt).
210 1 note that while the plurality in Johnson characterized the latter right as "con-
stitutional" and "basic to a fair trial," see supra note 129 and accompanying text, it
never explicitly noted the origins of the right. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S.
73, 87-88 (1983).
It might be objected that viewing the right to consideration of all elementally rele-
vant evidence as part of the jury-trial guarantee would transform a trial judge's
improper exclusion of relevant evidence into structural error-a position that the
Court has not taken and will not take. This argument ignores the fact that the inten-
tional (albeit improper) exclusion of elementally relevant evidence, although often as
damaging as the narrowing effect engendered by conclusive mandatory presumptions
and elemental misdescriptions, does not compromise the criminal trial structure surely
contemplated by the Sixth Amendment: a jury returning a verdict after considering all
the admitted evidence. But cf. Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2116-19 (1993)
(holding, in the course of a Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), "new rule" analysis,
that the Court's due process precedent had not foreordained that a jury instruction
that precludes the jury from considering evidence relevant to a state law affirmative
defense violates the Due Process Clause).
211 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
212 Id. at 309-10.
213 Id. (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78).
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Errors that deprive defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial in serious criminal cases, and their concomitant rights to have
the jury make all elemental determinations and consider all admitted, ele-
mentally relevant evidence, certainly meet this definition of "structural
error." The presence of a jury of one's peers as factfinder is as integral, if
not more so, to the framework within which a serious criminal trial pro-
ceeds as the other structural guarantees identified in Fulminante: counsel
for the defendant, an impartial judge, a grand jury untainted by racial
discrimination in its selection, the right to self-representation, and the
right to a public trial.214 And, of course, the presence of a jury is ren-
dered meaningless if it is precluded from fulfilling its factfinding function.
Moreover, the jury-trial right has been identified as "a fundamental
right [that] ... must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation
to extend due process of law to all persons within their jurisdiction." '215
Although its primary purpose is "to prevent oppression by the Govern-
ment,, 216 the jury also serves to legitimize the trial process before the
defendant and other observers. The Court has explained both of these
functions:
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experi-
ence that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal
charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too respon-
sive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions
strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further
protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safe-
guard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the
common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it....
Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Gov-
ernments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in
this insistence upon community participation in the determination of
guilt or innocence.21 7
Thus, if centrality to the American criminal justice system has any bear-
ing on whether a right is a "basic protection" without which "no criminal
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair," the jury-trial right
would seem to qualify.
The argument that the jury-trial right and the rights subsumed by it are
structural also finds significant support in current Supreme Court cases.
Obviously, there is Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carella, which explic-
214 Id. at 310.
215 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968).
216 Id. at 155.
217 Id. at 156.
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itly states that the jury-trial right is a "structural guarantee" and treats the
right to have the jury make all elemental determinations as part and par-
cel of this right. 18 More importantly, there is Sullivan v. Louisiana, a
unanimous decision in which the Court observed that the jury-trial guar-
antee is a " 'basic protection' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but
without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function., 219 In
Sullivan, the Court held that a deprivation of the right to a jury verdict of
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a right encompassed by the jury-trial
guarantee, "unquestionably qualifies as 'structural error.' "220 The very
same logic compels the conclusion that a deprivation of the rights to have
the jury make all elemental determinations and to consider all admitted,
elementally relevant evidence-rights as much a part of the Sixth
Amendment's jury-trial guarantee as the right to a jury verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt221-constitutes structural error . 222
The contention that a deprivation of these two rights constitutes struc-
tural error still confronts a significant obstacle-Fulminante's indication,
in a string citation, that conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemen-
tal misdescriptions are trial errors.223 A contextually sensitive reading of
Fulminante, however, demonstrates that it should not be regarded as
binding precedent on the categorization of these errors.
First, Fulminante did not involve conclusive mandatory presumptions
or elemental misdescriptions; in fact, it was not concerned with instruc-
218 Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 267-71 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment); cf. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 582 n.11 (1986) (reaffirming "that the determi-
nation of guilt or innocence ... is for the jury rather than the court," but failing to
note that some Sandstrom error circumvents the jury rather than merely affecting it).
219 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993) (citing Rose, 478 U.S. at 577).
220 Id.
221 See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
222 Commentators have pointed out, with considerable justification, that the Court,
while paying periodic lip service to the nature of the undermined right, really "is no
longer valuing the nature of the right involved in its determination whether to apply
harmless error analysis." See Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of
a Capital Case: A Doctrine Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REv. 125, 142-
43 (1993); see also Ogletree, supra note 19, at 161-72 (arguing that the overemphasis
on the accuracy of the trial result inhering in Fulminante's trial-error/structural-error
distinction has subverted the other important societal values served when courts vigi-
lantly safeguard criminal defendants' constitutional rights). Instead, these commenta-
tors have argued, the Court merely looks to whether "prejudice is difficult to
calculate." Carter, supra, at 142.
Even assuming that such a force is at work in the Court's harmless-error jurispru-
dence, the result I reach would be no different. If the Court did not regard the "fun-
damental" nature of the jury-trial right as important, Sullivan makes clear that the
"unquantifiable and indeterminate" consequences of its denial render the denial
structural error. See Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2083.
223 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1991).
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tional error at all.224 Thus, courts deriving great significance from Fulmi-
nante's reference to these types of instructional errors as trial errors are
relying on unadulterated dictum from a case that was considering the
effects of improperly admitted evidence, i.e., typical trial error.
More importantly, it is apparent that Fulminante did not rule that con-
clusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions do not
undermine structural guarantees. From context, it is clear that the major-
ity included the string citation containing the reference to these errors
only to point out: (1) that a wide array of constitutional errors have been
subjected to harmless-error review; and (2) that the "common thread"
connecting these errors was that they "occurred during the presentation
of the case to the jury., 22" Nothing in the majority opinion even remotely
suggests an intention to hold that all of the errors enumerated in the
string citation should henceforth be reviewed for harmlessness in the
traditional whole-record manner.226
Thus, I construe Fulminante's "trial error" characterization of the
errors included in its string citation as merely meaning that these errors
are amenable to harmless-error review.227 Similarly, I regard Fulmi-
nante's statement that these errors "may therefore be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine
whether [their] admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"22 as
noncontextual overreaching. 229 In so stating, I note that the majority's
use of the word "admission" in the preceding quotation makes it all but
certain that it only had in mind the more typical form of trial error, i.e.,
improperly admitted evidence or argument, when it stated that trial
errors should be quantitatively assessed for harmlessness in the context of
the whole record.
To sum up, in deciding whether and how conclusive mandatory pre-
sumptions and elemental misdescriptions should be reviewed for harm-
lessness, courts should first recognize that these errors tend to undermine
the Sixth Amendment rights to have the jury make all elemental determi-
nations and to consider all admitted, elementally relevant evidence.
Courts should then analyze these rights in light of the Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, which makes clear that their denial con-
224 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
225 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-07.
226 Given that the effect of admitting constitutionally defective evidence is unques-
tionably subject to whole-record, quantitative assessment, there simply was no basis
for the Court to have considered this issue.
227 See Libby v. Duval, 19 F.3d 733, 743 (1st Cir.) (Stahl, J., dissenting) (reading
the string citation in Fulminante as merely indicating that a conclusive presumption is
amenable to harmless-error review), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 314 (1994).
228 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08 (emphasis added).
229 See Libby, 19 F.3d at 743 (Stahl, J., dissenting) (refusing to apply a whole-
record harmless-error test to these errors).
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stitutes structural error. Finally, courts should not read Fulminante as
overruling this jurisprudence sub silentio.
B. Courts Should Employ the Carella Test When Reviewing for
Harmless Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental
Misdescriptions
If the Sixth Amendment rights undermined by conclusive mandatory
presumptions and elemental misdescriptions are structural, deprivation of
these rights can never be harmless. 230 There are, however, certain " 'rare
situations' when 'the reviewing court can be confident that [such errors]
did not play any role in the jury's verdict' " and did not deprive the
defendant of these rights.23 ' These errors are, therefore, properly subject
to some form of harmless-error review. Justice Scalia's Carella test is the
proper means for conducting such a review.
First, the Carella test recognizes the structural nature of the constitu-
tional guarantees that conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental
misdescriptions tend to undermine. In the case of ordinary whole-record
harmless-error review, the question of whether an error denied a particu-
lar criminal defendant of rights (constitutional or otherwise) is not dis-
positive. Indeed, the whole-record reviews that Chapman and Kotteakos
prescribe measure the likely impact of a given error on the jury, and
thereby presuppose that the error resulted in a denial of rights. Clearly,
therefore, reviewing courts cannot apply Chapman or Kotteakos when
presented with conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental mis-
descriptions, which by their nature are harmful whenever they have any
impact on the jury. Instead, courts reviewing these errors must use a
harmless-error test that focuses directly on whether the errors deprived a
defendant of rights.
The Carella test is sensitive to this need. The test identifies those
instances in which the absence of an elemental finding does not matter,
because the finding is irrelevant, or because the jury, in effect, made the
finding despite the presumption or misdescription. Thus, without being
overinclusive, the test covers the universe of situations in which a review-
ing court can say with near-total confidence and objectivity that the con-
clusive mandatory presumption or elemental misdescription had no effect
upon the jury.23 2 Furthermore, it does so without speculation about what
a properly instructed jury would have found.
230 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (cataloguing structural errors).
231 Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 270 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
232 Of course, deciding whether factual findings actually made by the jury are the
"functional equivalent" of the presumed or misdescribed element at times involves
subjective judgments. Nevertheless, as long as the question the reviewing court asks
itself is "By finding X, did the jury in effect find Y as well?," and not "Having found
X, would the jury also have found Y?," this subjectivity is highly cabined.
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A second reason reviewing courts should use the Carella test is that the
test is faithful to the theoretical underpinnings of harmless-error theory.
As I have explained, the Carella test determines only whether the
absence of a jury finding is irrelevant or whether there essentially has
been a jury finding. The ordinary whole-record harmless-error tests pre-
scribed by Chapman and Kotteakos, however, presuppose the existence
of elemental jury determinations. They therefore cannot operate when
such determinations are absent. In a direct review case, where Chapman
would ordinarily apply, the Court has explained this infirmity:
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which the
jury actually rested its verdict .... The inquiry, in other words, is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict
would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.
That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was
never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings
to support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial
guarantee....
Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the Chap-
man inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-error review
[where there has been no jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt]
becomes evident. Since, for the reasons described above, there has
been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,
the entire premise of Chapman review is simply absent. There being
no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question
whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly
meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-
error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can con-
clude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt-not that the jury's actual finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different
absent the constitutional error. That is not enough.233
C. Courts Should Apply the Carella Test on both Direct and Collateral
Review
Even if one accepts that reviewing courts must apply the Carella test
to conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions in
order to guard against usurpation of the jury's factfinding function and to
remain faithful to the theoretical underpinnings of harmless-error theory,
one need not necessarily believe that the test should apply on both direct
and collateral review. The Court has made it quite clear that "collateral
233 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1993) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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review is different from direct review,, 23 4 and that " 'an error that may
justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support' " the grant-
ing of a writ of habeas corpus.23 5 One therefore could accept the propri-
ety of the Carella test on direct review and argue for whole-record review
on habeas, even in the context of conclusive mandatory presumptions and
elemental misdescriptions.
This argument, however, necessarily entails the view that habeas
should only serve as a final check on whether an innocent person has
been punished. Application of whole-record harmless-error review to
conclusive mandatory presumptions and elemental misdescriptions
would, after all, require a reviewing court to guess at what a properly
instructed jury would have done. In other words, it would direct the
court to determine whether guilt can be spelt out of the record. And as I
stated in the introduction, if record evidence of guilt is sufficient to
render harmless the denial of a criminal defendant's structural Sixth
Amendment jury-trial right, it also should be sufficient to render harm-
less all other constitutional errors.
There is a significant problem with any theory of habeas review that
would preclude the issuance of the writ if the court believed the peti-
tioner guilty. Such a theory would set those interests most often
advanced for a restrictive theory of habeas availability-finality, comity,
federalism, and the primacy of the trial itself2" 6-above all other interests
save that of preventing the punishment of an innocent person. To illus-
trate, the writ would not be available under this theory to apparently
guilty defendants who did not have legal representation at trial, or whose
trials were infected with racial or religious prejudice. These errors would
be harmless so long as an appeals court could satisfy itself that the
defendant had committed the crime. This would unconscionably
underweigh society's interest in not depriving citizens of life or liberty
without criminal trials that at least appear fundamentally fair.2" 7
234 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993).
235 Id. at 1720 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).
236 See, e.g., id. at 1720-21 (advancing arguments for a restrictive approach to
habeas review).
237 One might, of course, argue that the states are fully willing and able, at least in
this day and age, to make certain that fundamental federal constitutional rights are
vindicated on direct review. This argument would answer the question whether there
should be habeas review; it is not, however, responsive to the argument that collateral
review, so long as we do have it, should safeguard constitutional rights that are essen-
tial to the appearance of fundamental fairness. The states are, after all, equally willing
and able to make certain that the innocent are not incarcerated. But implicit in the
existence of habeas is a desire for something more. Those who would accept habeas
but argue that it should only protect against punishment of the innocent would need
to explain why a desire to protect rights essential to the appearance of fairness should
not be part of this "something more." I believe that any such argument would be
unconvincing.
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In fact, the Court's numerous pronouncements cutting back on the
availability of federal habeas corpus reject exactly this sort of limited fact-
bound role for collateral review. Of the cases that address the types of
substantive claims amenable to review on habeas, Herrera v. Collins238
most notably rejected the notion that federal habeas should serve only to
check the factual innocence of incarcerated petitioners. The majority in
that case clearly stated that federal collateral review exists to rectify vio-
lations of constitutional criminal procedure protections.239 Similarly,
Teague v. Lane,240 though restricting collateral review to "old rules" of
criminal procedure, made clear that such review exists in order to deter
violations of the Bill of Rights.24'
Cases establishing procedural roadblocks to collateral review also
demonstrate that habeas exists to remedy constitutional violations, and
not to release the innocent. These decisions do establish a test for "actual
innocence. '2 42 But that doctrine is merely a gateway to federal review of
the merits of an otherwise-barred constitutional claim.243 And though
the Court justifies its gateway standards on grounds of comity, finality,
and federalism, these interests are clearly subordinate to the primary pur-
pose of collateral review: ensuring that convictions generally are not
obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights.244
At any rate, the question of whether collateral review should be avail-
able in the face of record evidence of guilt is, or rather should be, aca-
238 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
239 Id. at 860 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (emphasizing the "principle that federal habeas
courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitu-
tion-not to correct errors of fact").
240 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
241 Id. at 305-08, 310 (plurality opinion).
242 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (making explicit the
bar against federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims unless a petitioner
shows a "miscarriage of justice"); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502-03 (1991)
(noting that the miscarriage of justice exception allowing consideration of a petition
that would otherwise constitute abuse of the writ does not apply when the violation
complained of is misuse of an inculpatory statement); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion) (declaring that the "ends of justice" require federal
courts to hear successive habeas petitions "only where the prisoner supplements his
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence).
243 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862-63 (explaining that the actual-innocence doctrine
exists to prevent "miscarriages of justice," but that it does not generally support free-
standing claims of actual innocence).
244 Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1751 (1993) (allowing habeas review of
Miranda violations and thereby refusing to extend the rule of Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (precluding habeas review of claimed Fourth Amendment violations),
because habeas works to deter violations of "trial right[s]" that assure the "fairness,
and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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demic. Habeas courts that have read Brecht as directing them to scan
the record for evidence of guilt in conducting their harmless-error assess-
ments have overlooked three things. First, Brecht adopts the Kotteakos
harmless-error test. And if Kotteakos is clear on anything, it is that rec-
ord evidence of guilt does not itself render an error harmless.24 5 Second,
Brecht reaffirms Fulminante's indication that " 'structural defects.., defy
analysis by 'harmless-error' standards.' "246 Thus, habeas courts must
take the nature of the error into account, and should not simply look for
evidence of guilt in the record when they make their harmlessness assess-
ments. Third, and finally, a unanimous Court in Yates v. Evatt clearly
stated that whole-record review does not empower a court to spell guilt
out of the record, or to consider evidence that the jury did not con-
sider.247 It strains credulity to conclude that the four members of the
Brecht majority who signed Yates changed their views on these matters
within two years. And it strains credulity even more to deduce that they
did so with nary a word on the subject. Reviewing courts, therefore,
245 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946) (directing reviewing
courts to inquire not whether the verdict was correct in spite of the error, but rather
whether the error had any effect on the verdict). One predisposed towards the view
that the Carella test is derivative of Chapman might contend that Brecht's adoption of
the Kotteakos standard should dictate application of some "less rigorous" form of the
Carella test on collateral review. An example might be altering the third prong of the
test so that a habeas court would look at whether, in light of findings actually made,
the jury "likely" would have made the missing finding. Cf. Libby v. Duval, 19 F.3d
733, 740 (1st Cir.) (holding it "extremely unlikely," that the jury would have failed to
make the missing finding), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 314 (1994). Such an argument
would fail for two reasons.
First, the Carella test is an all-or-nothing proposition; it is designed to determine, to
a certainty, whether a conclusive mandatory presumption or elemental misdescription
had any effect upon a jury's factfinding function. And it presumes that any such effect
is harmful. Thus, to reduce the test's rigor is to ignore the principles underlying its
creation.
Second, as the Libby court's alteration of the test suggests, a reduction in the test's
rigor would necessitate the supplying of missing factual findings every bit as much as
any whole-record harmless-error test. After all, what difference is there between (1)
looking at all the evidence and determining what a correctly instructed jury would
have found; and (2) looking at the facts actually found by the jury and determining, in
light of these findings, whether the jury "likely" or "probably" would have found the
missing element?
246 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993) (quoting Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)).
247 See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,405-07 & nn.10-11 (1991) (holding that whole-
record harmless-error analysis is inappropriate where the jury did not consider all the
evidence because the trial court instructed it to draw a mandatory conclusion). Of
course, because Yates predated Brecht, the Yates Court applied Chapman. As I have
pointed out, however, the Kotteakos harmless-error test embraced by the Brecht
majority, like the Chapman test, is whole-record. See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
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should not construe Brecht so broadly that it sub silentio overrules Yates,
as well as the settled authority warning against spelling guilt out of the
record.248 Instead, they should restrict Brecht to its context, and read it
as simply holding that courts reviewing collateral challenges to typical
trial errors should employ the Kotteakos harmless-error test.
CONCLUSION
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has used language that
casts doubt on what once was a settled proposition: that courts con-
ducting harmless-error review should not usurp the criminal jury's
factfinding function by finding an error harmless when the record spells
out guilt. In so doing, the Court has (1) improperly treated as inter-
changeable rebuttable mandatory presumptions, conclusive mandatory
presumptions, and elemental misdescriptions; (2) failed to take account
of the very different constitutional rights that these types of instructional
error undermine; and (3) incorrectly implied that all errors amenable to
harmless-error review are amenable to a quantitative assessment in light
of the whole record. As a result, at least in the context of instructional
error that interferes with the jury's factfinding function, several circuit
courts of appeals are now disregarding Sixth Amendment concerns and
making harmlessness rulings on the basis of prognostications about what
correctly instructed juries would have done.249
This development is regrettable for two reasons. First, courts supplying
missing factual findings, whether on direct or collateral review, work
from a cold record. They have not had the opportunity either to view the
evidence first-hand or to evaluate such intangibles as the credibility and
demeanor of the witnesses. This raises grave concerns about institutional
competence. Second, and even more importantly, courts supplying miss-
ing factual findings deprive criminal defendants of a right fundamental to
the American criminal justice system: the right to a jury trial in serious
criminal cases.
The Supreme Court should reverse this development. At the earliest
opportunity, the Court should clarify that the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial, which encompasses the rights to have the jury make all ele-
mental determinations and to consider all admitted, elementally relevant
evidence, is structural. The Court should also make clear that a de facto
deprivation of the jury-trial right can never be harmless. Finally, the
Court should specifically hold that the harmless-error test suggested by
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Carella v. California provides the
proper basis, on both direct and collateral review, for assessing the effect
of instructional error that interferes with the jury's factfinding role. In
248 See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946).
249 See supra notes 7, 181 (listing cases in which reviewing courts have evaluated
trial evidence to determine what the jury's finding would have been).
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the face of such error, only the Carella test preserves the Sixth Amend-
ment jury-trial right and comports with the theoretical underpinnings of
harmless-error analysis.
